

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2074

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0263

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SUBJ HIGHLIGHTS OF GRAYBEAL/ USTINOV PRIVATE CONVERSATION, JUN 15

1. SPEAKING FROM PREPARED NOTES, USTINOV SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED IT DESIRABLE TO MAINTAIN DIRECT CONTACT AND TO SPEAK FRANKLY IN ORDER TO HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF FACTORS WHICH AFFECT PROGRESS IN THE SCC. THEREFORE, HE WANTED TO SHARE WITH GRAYBEAL SOME OF HIS CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE OF THINGS IN WORKING OUT DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES.

2. THE SOVIET DRAFT PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES FOR REPLACEMENT OF LAND- BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS OF OLDER TYPES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON OLDER SUBMARINES BY BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON MODERN SUBMARINES WAS COMPILES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET AND U. S. DOCUMENTS, AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTENCE OF APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS IN PAST EXCHANGES. IT PROVIDES AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION TO DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONFIDENCE THAT PROVIDIONS OF THE

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INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE BEING CARRIED OUT.

3. USTINOV SAID THAT IN ANALYZING THE U. S. PROPOSAL, IT SEEMED TO CONTAIN INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE OVERALL APPROACH AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U. S. GENERAL GUIDELINES STATE THAT NOT ONE BUT SEVERAL PROCEDURES COULD BE PROVIDED FROM AMONG WHICH EACH SIDE COULD CHOOSE. BUT IN ACTUAL FACT U. S. CONSIDERATIONS REDUCE EVERYTHING TO WHAT THE U. S. SIDE CALLS FRAGMENTATION. MOREOVER, NO CHOICE IS PROVIDED BETWEEN DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING. THUS, DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION IS REDUCED TO ACTION OF ONE KIND, THE ONLY EXCEPTION IN PRACTICE BEING WITH RESPECT TO SUBMARINES. USTINOV THOUGHT THAT THE MAIN CRITERION FOR JUDGING EFFECTIVENESS OF DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES MUST BE THAT LAND- BASED LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS ARE PUT IN SUCH A CONDITION AS TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR USE FOR LAUNCHING MISSILES. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED NOT ONLY BY FRAGMENTATION BUT ALSO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. FROM AN ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION, IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO DESTROY COSTLY FACILITIES WHEN THEIR RETENTION WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

4. USTINOV NOTED THE U. S. GENERAL GUIDELINE THAT THE PROCEDURES SHOULD PRECLUDE REACTIVATION TIME OF DEACTIVATED UNITS BEING SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, PROVIDES FOR PROCEDURES WHICH PRECLUDE, AND USTINOV WANTED TO DRAW GRAYBEAL'S ATTENTION TO THE WORD "PRECLUDE", THE USE OF REPLACED FACILITIES FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS OR SLBMs. THUS, THE SOVIET APPROACH WAS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

5. USTINOV NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IT WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING PROCEDURES WHICH ARE BEING WORKED OUT TO BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES USING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

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ON THE CONTRARY, THE OBJECT WAS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS.

6. USTINOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERED THE U. S. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES TO BE SUPERFLUOUS, NEEDLESS AND CUMBERSOME. FOR INSTANCE, THE SIDES

DON' T EVEN HAVE COMMON DEFINITIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE BEGINNING OF SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION. CONSEQUENTLY, CONSIDERING THE TIME AND EFFORT THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR WORKING OUT THESE DEFINITIONS THE U. S. PROPOSALS SEEM TO BE ILL ADVISED. (HE THEN REPEATED SOVIET POSITION).

7. USTINOV NOTED THAT A SIX" MONTH PERIOD FIGURED FREQUENTLY IN THE U. S. POSITION AS AN INDICATOR OF A GUARANTEE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS COULD IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONS. WITHOUT AGREEING WITH THIS POSITION, HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT MANY DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING OPERATIONS INVOLVE A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AND A GREAT AMOUNT OF WORK. THE TIME ELEMENT THEREFORE, SPEAKS IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

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8. USTINOV SAID EACH SIDE COULD, ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, PROVIDE SUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS IT THOUGHT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO, OR BE NECESSARY FOR, ENHANCING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

9. USTINOV CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT THE U. S. COMPONENT TO TAKE ALL OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT DURING FUTURE WORK OF THE SCC.

10. GRAYBEAL SAID THAT HE WOULD STUDY USTINOV' S REMARKS

AND TODAY'S SOVIET PROPOSAL. HE WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT THE SCC HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE JOB OF AGREEING ON PROCEDURES, AND IN ORDER TO WORK OUT AGREED PROCEDURES IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT EACH SIDE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POINTS OF VIEW, AND THE REASONING BEHIND SUCH POINTS OF VIEW, OF THE OTHER SIDE. GRAYBEAL SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CAREFULLY STUDY USTINOV'S REMARKS BEFORE RESPONDING FULLY, NEVERTHELESS, HE WANTED TO MAKE SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS TODAY. OBVIOUSLY, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE SIDES, AS SHOWN TODAY, WITH RESPECT TO WHAT CONSTITUTES ADEQUATE PROCEDURES, AND ON THE MATTER OF ENHANCING CONFIDENCE IN THE AGREEMENTS. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT VERIFICATION OF PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE INTERIM

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AGREEMENT WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF BOTH SIDES, WE SHOULD DEVELOP PROCEDURES IN SUCH A MANNER THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IT WAS GRAYBEAL'S VIEW THAT THESE PROCEDURES SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

11. GRAYBEAL SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE U. S. M. GENERAL GUIDELINES AND THE U. S. PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THE PHRASE " MORE THAN ONE ACCEPTABLE DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING PROCEDURE, FROM WHICH EACH SIDE MAY CHOOSE, SHOULD BE AGREED FOR EACH SYSTEM, COMPONENT, AND TYPE OF LAUNCHER" IS PRECEDED BY THE WORDS TO " WHERE APPROPRIATE." HE STATED THAT THE GUIDELINES SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A BASIS FOR PROCEDURES NOT ONLY FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE ABM TREATY, BUT ALSO WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE AGREEMENTS.

12. GRAYBEAL STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING PROCEDURES FOR ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THESE LAUNCHERS COULD NOT BE USED AGAIN FOR THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE; HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THAT OBJECTIVE. GRAYBEAL SAID THAT IN THE U. S. VIEW THERE WERE TWO IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING PROCEDURES FOR ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE PROCEDURES EMPLOYED MUST RESULT IN VERIFIABLE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT THE FACILITIES ARE NO LONGER USEABLE TO LAUNCH MISSILES; THE SECOND WAS THAT THE PROCEDURES MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY RIGOROUS TO PRECLUDE REACTIVATION IN A

PERIOD OF TIME SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THAT WHICH WOULD
BE REQUIRED TO CONSTRUCT NEW FACILITIES.

13. GRAYBEAL SAID THAT THE U. S COMPONENT WOULD HAVE
MORE TO SAY ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES. THE BASIC
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES WAS THAT THE SOVIET

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SIDE ENVISAGED NOTIFICATION AFTER THE EVENT, WHEREAS
THE U. S. SIDE PROPOSED NOTIFICATION BOTH BEFORE AND
AFTER SUCH ACTIONS WERE TAKEN. BOTH SIDES ARE AWARE
OF THE NUMEROUS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ICBM
LAUNCHERS AND DIRECTLY RELATED TO SLBM SUBMARINES
AND LAUNCHERS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE
VIABILITY OF PRESENT AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS THAT EACH
SIDE KNOW WHICH ACTIVITIES WERE A PART OF DESTRUCTION AND
DISMANTLING.

14. GRAYBEAL AND USTINOV AGREED THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS
SET FORTH BY EACH IN THIS INFORMAL SESSION WOULD BE
CONVEYED TO THE WORKING GROUP. GRAYBEAL

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